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Previous knowledge can induce an
illusion of causality through actively
biasing behavior
Ion Yarritu and Helena Matute *
Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
It is generally assumed that the way people assess the relationship between a cause and
an outcome is closely related to the actual evidence existing about the co-occurrence of
these events. However, people’s estimations are often biased, and this usually translates
into illusions of causality. Some have suggested that such illusions could be the result of
previous knowledge-based expectations. In the present research we explored the role
that previous knowledge has in the development of illusions of causality. We propose that
previous knowledge influences the assessment of causality by influencing the decisions
about responding or not (i.e., presence or absence of the potential cause), which biases
the information people are exposed to, and this in turn produces illusions congruent
with such biased information. In a non-contingent situation in which participants decided
whether the potential cause was present or absent (Experiment 1), the influence of
expectations on participants’ judgments was mediated by the probability of occurrence
of the potential cause (determined by participants’ responses). However, in an identical
situation, except that the participants were not allowed to decide the occurrence of
the potential cause (Experiment 2), only the probability of the cause was significant,
not the expectations or the interaction. Together, these results support our hypothesis
that knowledge-based expectations affect the development of causal illusions by the
mediation of behavior, which biases the information received.
Keywords: previous knowledge, expectations, causal judgments, cognitive bias, causal learning, contingency
learning, contingency judgment, illusion of causality
Introduction
Existing evidence questions the ability of humans to make accurate assessments of causality (e.g.,
Allan and Jenkins, 1983; Perales and Shanks, 2007; Hannah and Beneteau, 2009; Blanco et al., 2011;
Matute et al., 2011). Even though there are conditions in which people are perfectly capable of mak-
ing precise estimations about causal relationships between events (e.g., Ward and Jenkins, 1965;
Peterson, 1980; Shanks and Dickinson, 1987; Allan, 1993), there are also well-established situations
that invariably lead to a biased interpretation of the available evidence, resulting in systematic devi-
ations from the objective assessment of causality (e.g., Jenkins and Ward, 1965; Allan and Jenkins,
1983; Blanco et al., 2009; Hannah and Beneteau, 2009). Importantly, those deviations may produce
the illusion that two events are causally related when they are, in fact, totally independent from each
other (e.g., illusions of causality such as the illusion of control; Langer, 1975; Alloy and Abramson,
1979; Matute, 1994, 1995; Yarritu et al., 2014). Some studies suggest that prior expectations might
be at the basis of such deviations from the objective assessment of causality, and consequently, they
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are the main source of these illusions (e.g., Chapman and Chap-
man, 1967). The main purpose of the present study is to explore
the role that expectations have in the development of the illusion
of causality.
It is generally assumed that causal judgments are built on the
basis of available evidence derived from the co-occurrence of
cause and outcome events (e.g., Jenkins and Ward, 1965; Shak-
lee and Mims, 1981; Crocker, 1982; Allan and Jenkins, 1983; Kao
and Wasserman, 1993; White, 2009; Shanks, 2010). Two events
can be combined in four possible ways depending on their pres-
ence or absence. When the cause event is present, the outcome
can be present or absent. Likewise, when the cause is absent,
the outcome can also be present or absent. These four possi-
bilities are commonly represented by the lower case letters, a,
b, c, and d, as shown in Table 1 (e.g., Jenkins and Ward, 1965;
Allan and Jenkins, 1983; Kao and Wasserman, 1993; Perales and
Shanks, 2007). Recognizing the frequencies of each of these dif-
ferent cases, we can easily compute the probabilities of the occur-
rence of the outcome in the presence of the cause, p (O|C) =
a/
(
a+ b
)
, and in its absence, p (O|¬C) = c/
(
c+ d
)
. The dif-
ference between these two conditioned probabilities leads to the
contingency index, 1p (Jenkins and Ward, 1965; Allan, 1980;
Allan and Jenkins, 1983).1p is a mathematical representation of
contingency that has been broadly taken as the normative value
against which participants’ judgments in human causal learning
experiments should be compared (e.g., Jenkins and Ward, 1965;
Shaklee and Mims, 1981; Allan and Jenkins, 1983; Shanks and
Dickinson, 1987). Furthermore, the concept of contingency has
been regarded as the cornerstone of most of the models pro-
posed to explain causal learning (e.g., Rescorla, 1968; Rescorla
and Wagner, 1972; Cheng, 1997).
Evidence shows that human causal judgments are sensitive to
contingency (e.g., Jenkins and Ward, 1965; Allan and Jenkins,
1983; Shanks and Dickinson, 1987). However, a number of stud-
ies present data showing that under certain situations deviations
from normatively expected assessment are systematic (e.g., Alloy
and Abramson, 1979; Allan and Jenkins, 1983; Kao and Wasser-
man, 1993; Hannah and Beneteau, 2009; Blanco et al., 2011;
Matute et al., 2011; Matute and Blanco, 2014). In order to explain
those deviations some researchers have suggested that people do
not weigh the different cells of the contingency matrix shown in
Table 1 in the same manner ( e.g., Wasserman et al., 1990; Kao
and Wasserman, 1993; Anderson and Sheu, 1995; White, 2009).
Following this cell-weighting hypothesis, each of the four cells has
a different relative weight with respect to the others, in such a way
that some cells have a greater impact than others in the causal
TABLE 1 | Contingency table.
Outcome
Present
(
O
)
Absent
(
¬O
)
Potential cause
Present
(
C
)
a b
Absent
(
¬C
)
c d
C, potential cause; O, outcome.
estimations. The typically observed order of cells based on their
relative weight is a > b > c > d (seeWasserman et al., 1990; Kao
and Wasserman, 1993). Following this view, the instances that
have greater impact on causal judgments are those in which the
occurrence of cause and outcome coincide (cell “a”). Supporting
this idea, a number of studies have indicated the special role that
coincidences have in the elaboration of causal judgments (Jenk-
ins and Ward, 1965; Crocker, 1982; Matute et al., 2011). These
studies have attributed the responsibility for deviations from the
objective assessment to the special meaning conferred by people
to coincidences. In that way, the conditions that contribute to
a larger number of cases in which cause and outcome coincide
should promote the overestimation of the relationship between
them (see Yarritu et al., 2014).
This latter assumption concurs with existing evidence of biases
that systematically lead to deviations in causal judgments, such
as the outcome- and cause-density biases. These biases are related
to the marginal probabilities of the outcome and cause events.
A significant number of studies have shown that participants’
judgments tend to be higher as the probability of the outcome,
p (O), increases (e.g., Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Allan and Jenk-
ins, 1983; Matute, 1995; López et al., 1998; Msetfi et al., 2005;
Hannah and Beneteau, 2009; Byrom et al., 2015), even when that
probability is the same in the presence and in the absence of the
potential cause (i.e., zero contingency; e.g., Alloy and Abram-
son, 1979; Allan and Jenkins, 1983; Matute, 1995; Blanco et al.,
2013). Similarly, it has been observed that as the probability of
the cause, p (C), increases, participants’ judgments also tend to
increase (Allan and Jenkins, 1983; Perales and Shanks, 2007; Han-
nah and Beneteau, 2009; White, 2009; Musca et al., 2010; Vadillo
et al., 2011), even when the potential cause and the outcome
are non-contingently related (e.g., Hannah and Beneteau, 2009;
Blanco et al., 2013; Yarritu et al., 2015). The combination of these
two biases increases the overestimation of the causal relation-
ship when the two probabilities, p (C) and p (O), are high (Blanco
et al., 2013). Note that a high probability of both events necessar-
ily leads to a large number of coincidences, which, as predicted by
the cell-weighting hypothesis, should produce the overestimation
of causality.
Therefore, how people weight the available evidence seems
to determine participants’ causal judgments, and produce, under
certain conditions (e.g., situations in which the number of coin-
cidences is high), deviations from the objective causal rela-
tionship. However, some researchers have proposed another
source from which deviations of the objective causal assessments
could appear: the person’s previous knowledge-based expecta-
tions (e.g., Chapman and Chapman, 1967; Crocker and Taylor,
1978; Abramson and Alloy, 1980; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Peter-
son, 1980). For instance, Chapman and Chapman (1967) found
that when their participants were asked to judge the relationship
between randomly paired diagnostic test signs and symptoms,
they tended to illusorily correlate some of the signs with cer-
tain symptoms in a way that was congruent with their previous
knowledge.
One of the very first researchers who pointed out the relevance
of people’s previous knowledge about causal relationships was
Kelley (1972). Kelley used the concept causal schemata to refer
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to the body of knowledge that a person holds about how causes
and outcomes covary in the environment. According to Kelley
(1972), people act as naive scientists using in a correct manner
the evidence from the covariation between events (i.e., cells of the
contingency matrix), but eventually, when this source of infor-
mation is weak or insufficient, they invoke causal schemata to
solve the uncertainty. More recent approaches to this issue from
the perspective of Bayesian networks suggest that people pos-
sess a causal grammar which, like Kelley’s causal schemata, holds
abstract principles about how events can be causally related, and
provide hypothesis spaces in which the possible relationships can
be tested (e.g., Tenenbaum et al., 2006, 2007).
Nevertheless, other authors have gone beyond Kelley’s posi-
tion suggesting that people’s previous knowledge can be even
more decisive than available evidence in the establishment of
causal estimations (e.g., Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Metalsky and
Abramson, 1981; Alloy and Tabachnik, 1984; White, 1989; Grif-
fiths and Tenenbaum, 2005). In this vein, White (1989) proposed
that the available evidence about the covariation between cause
and outcome is taken into account only when the person consid-
ers the causal relationship to be plausible. Congruent withWhite’s
position, other researchers have suggested that causal inference
has two main stages, one in which the causal structure is inferred
from the available evidence (which would determine the plau-
sibility of the relationship) and other one in which the strength
of the relationship is estimated (e.g., Waldmann and Hagmayer,
2001; Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2005; Lagnado et al., 2007; De
Houwer, 2009). For example, Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2005)
propose a causal inference model that distinguishes between the
acquisition of a causal structure, in which the decision about
the existence of the relationship is made, and the estimation of
strength, in which the extent with which the events are related is
estimated. These researchers assume that structure acquisition is
more fundamental because the strength of the relationship can
only be estimated once the structure is acquired. Following up
on the idea that people must consider the existence of a relation-
ship before they estimate its intensity, Fugelsang and Thomp-
son (2000) carried out a series of experiments in which they
manipulated the scenarios in which causes and outcomes were
presented. Given the general knowledge of their participants,
some relationships were constructed so they seemed plausible,
whereas others were meant to be implausible. In addition, they
manipulated the covariation evidence presented in each scenario
varying the contingency between the cause and the outcome.
Both previous knowledge and contingency between cause and
outcome significantly affected participants’ causal judgments.
However, the effect of contingency was weaker when the sce-
narios presented implausible relationships. That is, in implau-
sible situations, available evidence was not as influential as it
was in the situations in which previous knowledge supported the
relationship.
Therefore, these results suggest that previous knowledge may
affect how available evidence is evaluated. Nisbett and Ross
(1980) also pointed out a position congruent with this idea.
They indicated that the information from previous knowledge
could mitigate the influence of available evidence when this evi-
dence was incongruent with such knowledge. They proposed that
this occurs because previous knowledge influences how people
collect, recall, and interpret new evidence.
Assuming this approach, Metalsky and Abramson (1981; see
also Alloy and Tabachnik, 1984) suggested that when previous
knowledge strongly suggests a particular covariation and avail-
able evidence is unambiguous but suggests the opposite conclu-
sion, people must solve the incongruence. According to Alloy
and Tabachnik (1984) this cognitive dilemma tends to be solved
in favor of previous knowledge. Interestingly, these authors pro-
pose how this inclination toward previous beliefs could occur.
They suggested that people distort the evidence they encounter
by overweighting those instances that are consistent with their
previous beliefs and underweighting those which are inconsis-
tent. In that way, the estimations about the frequency of each
different instance, i.e., each one of the four contingency cell
types described above (a, b, c, and d), will depend on the per-
son’s previous expectations about the relationship between the
cause and the outcome. For example, if a person believes that
there is a relationship between a cause and an outcome, he/she
will tend to overestimate the frequency of the cases that con-
firm the relationship (i.e., cells a and d) and underestimate the
frequency of instances that disconfirm the existence of a relation-
ship (i.e., cells c and b). If, on the contrary, a person believes that
the relationship does not exist, he/she will tend to overestimate
the frequency of disconfirming cases and underestimate the fre-
quency of confirming cases. Similarly, Crocker and Taylor (1978)
propose that in order to assess the relationship between events,
people will tend to establish a priori hypotheses based on their
previous knowledge. The sense of these hypotheses will deter-
mine the degree of confidence given to each instance of infor-
mation received, conferring greater credit to cases that confirm
those hypotheses than to those that refute them. Similar assump-
tions can be found in causal models based on Bayesian networks
(e.g.,Waldmann andMartignon, 1998; Griffiths and Tenenbaum,
2005) through the introduction of prior probability distributions
in causal inferences. This prior probability distribution formal-
izes the person’s a priori beliefs about the plausibility of different
hypotheses before the observation of new evidence, but taking
into account their background knowledge. In this way, a person’s
prior beliefs can favor some hypotheses over alternative ones and
can affect how this person will interpret new evidence.
Therefore, people seem to have a tendency to interpret avail-
able evidence in favor of their hypotheses, which are based on
their previous knowledge. This position is similar to the assump-
tions of the confirmation bias research tradition. Confirmation
bias is a phenomenon by which people tend to seek or interpret
available evidence in a way that is congruent with their beliefs,
expectations, or a priori hypotheses (see Nickerson, 1998 for a
broad review). This confirmation bias usually implies not only a
biased way of interpreting available evidence, but also an active
behavior consisting on seeking the information that confirms
previous hypothesis (e.g., Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972; Klay-
man and Ha, 1987; Evans, 1989; Nickerson, 1998). In this line,
some authors have suggested that previous knowledge may affect
the way people make interventions (as an opposite to merely
observe) to find the evidence that they need to make causal infer-
ences (e.g., Steyvers et al., 2003; Waldmann and Hagmayer, 2005;
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Schulz et al., 2007). This all suggested to us that when people have
the opportunity to intervene over the evidence they receive, prior
expectations might affect their behavior, and, in consequence,
might bias the information to which they are exposed. If this is
true, previous expectations could affect the development of the
illusion of causality by actively biasing behavior (and therefore
the information that people receive). The present research tests
this idea.
Overview of the Experiments
In a typical causal learning experiment participants are exposed
to information about the co-occurrence of causes and outcomes,
and then they are asked to emit their judgments about the rela-
tionship between the two events (e.g., Jenkins and Ward, 1965;
Allan and Jenkins, 1983; Wasserman, 1990). This information is
usually presented in a trial-by-trial format in which each trial rep-
resents one of the four contingency cell types described above
(Jenkins and Ward, 1965; Wasserman, 1990). The participants
of this type of experiment can play a passive or an active role
in the task (see Yarritu et al., 2014). That is, participants can
passively observe in each trial whether an external stimuli act-
ing as a potential cause is present or absent (e.g., a medicine
that has been administered or not to a fictitious patient) and
then they can observe whether or not the outcome occurs (e.g.,
whether the patient recovers or not). Alternatively, they can be
requested tomake an active response that acts as a potential cause
(e.g., to administer or not the medicine to the patient) and then
observe whether the outcome occurs or not given their action
(e.g., whether the patient recovers or not). In the first case, in
which the participants have a passive role, they have no way of
influencing the information they receive. The sequence of trials
(i.e., the frequency and order of each instance of the four contin-
gency cells) is pre-programed by the experimenter. In the second
case, however, the participants determine through their responses
the presence or absence of the potential cause in each trial (e.g.,
they choose whether or not to administer the medicine to the
patient). This means that the proportion of instances in which
the potential cause occurs, p (C), is subject to the free choice of
the participants who perform the experiment. Even though the
experimenter programs the outcome to occur with a given prob-
ability, and this is independent of the participants’ behavior, the
participants do influence, to a certain degree, the information
they are exposed to. If they respond with high frequency they will
receive more a and b instances than c and d instances, whereas if
they respond with low frequency, they will receive fewer a and b
instances than c and d.
We have already mentioned that p (C) is a powerful determi-
nant in the development of illusions of causality (e.g., Perales and
Shanks, 2007; Hannah and Beneteau, 2009; Blanco et al., 2013).
Importantly, this effect appears regardless of whether the poten-
tial cause is an external event or is the participants’ behavior (see
Hannah and Beneteau, 2009; Yarritu et al., 2014 for a discussion
on this topic). For instance, in her study about the illusion of
control, Matute (1996) found that participants tended to respond
with high frequency [i.e., high p (C)], in order to obtain a desired
outcome, and thus, they developed a high illusion of control.
When instructed about the need to respond with less frequency
her participants did reduce their p (C) and were able to accurately
detect that they had no control over the outcome. This effect has
been found in many situations in which, in one way or another,
participants have been induced to respond differently. For exam-
ple, in Yarritu et al.’s (2014) study, participants were restricted
in the number of responses they could make; in Hannah and
Beneteau’s (2009) work, participants were told, in each trial, how
and when to respond; in Byrom et al.’s (2015) study, participants
were asked to try to respond with a particular frequency. In this
way, the illusion of causality was reduced. Therefore, what could
we expect when a person is free to respond to obtain a desired
outcome? We propose that under these circumstances people’s
previous expectations about the causal relationship will influence
how they respond. If participants believe that their responses (i.e.,
cause present) will produce the desired outcome, they will tend
to respond with high probability (in order to obtain the outcome,
and perhaps also in order to confirm their expectations; see Gen-
eral Discussion). If, on the contrary, participants believe that the
outcome will occur when no response is given (i.e., cause absent),
they will tend to respond with low probability.
Thus, we suggest that by inducing different expectations we
should be able to induce different patterns of behavior, which in
turn could lead to a biased exposure to information. This biased
exposure to information will yield a deviation of the objective
assessment of contingency, which ultimately should lead to the
illusion of causality. That is, we propose a mediational hypothesis
by which expectations should affect participants’ assessments of
causality by modifying their p (C). In order to test this hypothesis
we conducted two experiments in which the previous expecta-
tions of the participants were manipulated, (a) in a free active
response situation (Experiment 1); and (b) in a passive situation
in which p (C) was manipulated by the experimenters (Exper-
iment 2). The first experiment was designed to test the medi-
ational hypothesis that the manipulation of expectations leads
to differences in the judgments of causality through an effect
on p (C). The second experiment was designed to control the
potential effect of the expectations over both, the p (C) and the
judgments of participants, which would compromise the medi-
ational hypothesis. We anticipated that previous expectations
would modulate the response patterns of participants, which in
turn would determine p (C) and, in consequence, the degree of
illusion of causality developed by the participants.
Experiment 1
In this experiment we used a computerized trial-by-trial learn-
ing task in which the mission of participants was to learn about
the effectiveness of a fictitious medicine to cure the crises caused
by a fictitious disease. Participants were free to administer or not
the medicine to a fictitious patient in each trial, and then they
observed if the patient had recovered or not. Half of the partici-
pants were informed that the previous recovery rate for patients
who had taken the medicine was 80% (8/10). The other half were
informed that the recovery rate for the patients who had not
taken the medicine was 80% (8/10). This recovery rate was the
same under both conditions and coincided with the probability
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of patients’ recovery throughout the experimental task, regard-
less of whether or not the participant had been administered
the medicine. This means that the medicine was totally inef-
fective, as the probability of patients’ recovery was independent
of its intake. At the end of the experiment participants were
requested to make a judgment about the effectiveness of the
medicine. In sum, the computer program collected the partici-
pant’s response in each trial as well as the judgment requested at
the end of the experiment. These variables were what we needed
to test a mediational model: expectations (independent variable),
p (C), i.e., the participants’ response probability during the exper-
iment, defined as the number of trials which included at least
one response divided by the total number of trials (mediator
variable), and judgments about the effectiveness of the medicine
emitted at the end of the experiment (dependent variable).
Because there was no contingency between the cause and the
outcome, the correct causal judgment should be zero. Of partic-
ular interest for the present research is whether different groups
develop different degrees of illusion (overestimation) of causal-
ity, and whether this effect is mediated by differential patterns of
behavior.
Method
Participants and Apparatus
Fifty-one anonymous Internet users who visited our virtual labo-
ratory (http://www.labpsico.deusto.es) participated in the exper-
iment. In agreement with ethical guidelines for human research
through the Internet (Frankel and Siang, 1999) we did not ask
them for any data that could compromise participants’ pri-
vacy, nor did we use cookies or software in order to obtain
such data. The procedure was approved by the ethics committee
of the University of Deusto. The experimental task was devel-
oped in a HTML document dynamically modified with the use
of JavaScript. This technology allowed running the experiment
through an Internet browser in such a way that volunteers could
participate anonymously on their personal computers. The soft-
ware randomly assigned each participant to one of the two exper-
imental groups, resulting in 26 participants in the group with
expectations of cause-outcome relationship (ExC-O Group) and
25 participants in the group with expectations of no cause-
outcome relationship (ExNoC-O Group).
Procedure and Design
The procedure used in the present experiment was an adapta-
tion of the allergy task (Wasserman, 1990). The reason we used
this task is that it has been widely used in studies of human
causal learning, including those focusing on the illusion of causal-
ity (e.g., Yarritu et al., 2014). In addition, the task has been
successfully tested in Internet experiments (e.g., Matute et al.,
2011). Using the initial instruction screens, all participants were
prompted to imagine being a medical doctor who specialized
in a rare disease called “Lindsay Syndrome.” They were then
told that there was a medicine called “Batatrim” that could cure
the crises produced by the disease, but that this medicine was
still in the testing stages. They also received information about
the actual frequency with which the outcome occurred, but this
information was worded differently for each of two groups. One
group of participants was informed about the frequency with
which the patients recovered from the crises (outcome) when
they had taken the medicine (potential cause). The other group
was informed about the frequency with which patients recov-
ered when they had not taken the medicine. The exact wording
of this sentence (translated from Spanish) was (a) The first tri-
als with this medicine showed that of 10 patients who had taken
Batatrim, eight recovered from the crises for Group ExC-O, and (b)
The first trials with this medicine showed that of 10 patients who
had NOT taken Batatrim, eight recovered from the crises for Group
ExNoC-O.
Thus, this sentence was the only difference between the two
groups and was our experimental manipulation. Note that the
two informative sentences are complementary descriptions of
the actual situation that participants will be exposed to: a sit-
uation in which there is no relationship between the medicine
and recovery but the probability of spontaneous recovery is high.
In both groups the outcome (recovery) occurs in 80% of the
trials regardless of whether the cause is present or absent. The
purpose of our subtle instructional manipulation was that par-
ticipants in the ExC-O Group would start the experiment with
the expectation that the medicine would produce the recovery of
the patients, whereas participants in the ExNoC-O Group would
start the experiment with the expectation that the medicine was
not necessary to produce that cure. As the entire experimental
task was identical for both groups of participants, any differ-
ence between the behaviors shown by the two groups must be
attributed to the expectations invoked by this slightly different
sentence. The remaining instructions informed participants that
they would see a series of records of patients, each representing a
patient to whom they could administer Batatrim to observe if the
patient recovered from the crisis or not.
Once the participant had read the instructions, the experiment
began. It consisted of two parts, a training phase and a test phase.
In the training phase, participants observed, trial by trial, medi-
cal records of fictitious patients. There were 100 trials (patients)
in total. In each trial participants were asked whether or not they
wanted to administer the medicine to the patient. The response
was made by clicking one of two buttons, Yes or No. Once the
choice was made, participants could see if the patient had recov-
ered or not from the crises. Therefore, the presence or absence
of the potential cause (the medicine intake) was the participant’s
choice. The outcome (patient’s recovery from the crises) was
presented in some trials following a pre-programmed pseudo-
random sequence. That is, the patients’ recovery occurred inde-
pendently of the participant’s decision to dispense the medicine.
The contingency between the medicine intake and the patients’
recovery was null, and the administration of the medicine neither
increased nor decreased the probability of recovery. The pro-
grammed probability with which the outcome occurred was 0.8.
As mentioned earlier, such high probabilities of the outcome tend
to favor the development of the illusion of causality (e.g., Alloy
and Abramson, 1979; Allan and Jenkins, 1983; Matute, 1995).
After completing all 100 training trials, participants began the test
phase in which the following question was presented (translated
from Spanish): To what extent do you think that Batatrim was
effective in healing the crises of the patients you have seen? The
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FIGURE 1 | Distribution of response probabilities of participants in
each group for Experiment 1.
answers were given by clicking on a 0–100 scale, anchored at 0
(definitely NOT) and 100 (definitely YES).
Results and Discussion
The Effect of Expectancies on Participants’ Behavior
Figure 1 shows the distributions of the p (C), i.e., the probabil-
ity of responding in both groups. As seen in the figure, the two
groups responded differently. Participants who were prompted
to believe that the administration of the medicine produced the
improvement of the patients (ExC-O Group) tended to dispense
the medicine in most trials; virtually all of the participants had
response rates beyond 50%. Moreover, a considerable number
of them responded in more than 90% of trials (including four
participants who responded in every trial). On the other hand,
the distribution of response probabilities of the participants who
were prompted to believe that the patients’ recovery occurred
often among those who did not take the drug (ExNoC-O Group)
was more heterogeneous. The modal tendency was to respond
below the 10% of trials (three participants responded in none
of the trials). However, whereas the ExC-O Group are certainly
responding at high rates the ExNoC-O Group have much larger
variability, with a much less consistent trend, which suggest an
asymmetric effect of expectations over the response rates of the
two groups. Means (and standard errors of the means) of the
probability of response of both groups can be seen in Table 2. A
simple t-test1 comparing both groups confirmed that the prob-
ability of responding in Group ExC-O was significantly higher
than in Group ExNoC-O, t(49) = 3.83, p < 0.001, d = 1.09.
1At first glance the distributions of p (C) depicted in Figure 1 seems not to fit
to a normal distribution, which suggests that non-parametric statistic should
be preferred to compare these two groups. For this reason, we conducted the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov probe to test the normality of the two samples. The results
indicate that we cannot refute the hypothesis of normality of the two group’s
p (C) distributions (p-values equal to 0.70 and 0.82 for the ExC-O group and the
ExNoC-O groups, respectively). Given these results we decided to report the t-
test comparisons. Nevertheless, we also conducted an alternative analysis using
the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test and the results do not differ from those
reported in the main text, U(49) = 163.00, Z = 3.06, p = 0.002.
TABLE 2 | Mean judgments and probabilities of response [i.e., p
(
C
)
] in
Experiment 1.
Group Judgment p
(
C
)
M SEM M SEM
ExC-O 65.153 4.923 0.737 0.037
ExNoC-O 45.160 6.611 0.448 0.066
M, mean; SEM, standard error of the mean.
FIGURE 2 | Mean frequencies of the four contingency cells to which
the participants of each group were exposed to during the Experiment
1. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
These response tendencies led participants to miss important
information about one of the two possible states of the potential
cause. Whereas participants who administered the medicine in
almost every trial (or in all of them) had little evidence (or no
evidence at all) about what happens when the patients do not
take the medicine (cause absent), those who administered the
medicine in almost none of the trials had little evidence about
what happens when patients take themedicine (cause present). In
order to further understand the differences that their differential
behavior caused in the information to which participants were
exposed in each group, we decided to analyse the frequencies of
the four contingency cells that they experienced. The means of
these frequencies for each group can be seen in Figure 2. Four
t-tests comparing the two groups confirmed that the frequen-
cies were different between both groups for cell a, t(49) = 3.76,
p < 0.001, d = 1.07; for cell b, t(49) = 3.87, p < 0.001,
d = 1.11; for cell c, t(49) = 3.76, p < 0.001, d = 1.07; and
for cell d, t(49) = 3.87, p < 0.001, d = 1.11. These results
testify the magnitude of the difference in the information to
which each group was exposed, revealing their biased exposure to
information.
Table 2 also shows the mean (and standard error of the mean)
of the participants’ judgments of effectiveness for the two groups.
We expected that our manipulation of the expectations would
affect not only the participant’s response rates but also the judg-
ments given at the end of the experiment. A t-test comparing
the two groups confirmed our hypothesis, with judgments being
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A
B
FIGURE 3 | Mediational model tested in Experiment 1. (A) Direct effect of the expectations over the judgments. (B) Indirect effect in which p
(
C
)
acts as a
mediator in the relationship between the expectations and judgments.
significantly higher in the ExC-O Group than in the ExNoC-O
Group, t(49) = 2.44, p = 0.018, d = 0.7.
Since participants were free to respond in each trial and the
occurrence of the outcome was predefined in a pseudorandom
sequence, there was some degree of variance in the contingency
to which participants were actually exposed. However, it cannot
be assumed that this variance was different between the groups,
t(49) = 1.872, p = 0.07, d = 0.53. For this reason, we doubt
that differences between groups in other variables are due to the
variance of the actually experienced contingency2.
Mediational Effect
We expected that the differences in the probability of respond-
ing [i.e., probability with which the potential cause occurs,
p (C)] would explain the differences between judgments. In other
words, we expected that p (C) acted as a mediator variable in
the effect of the manipulation of expectations over participants’
judgments. To test this hypothesis we carried out a mediational
analysis. In order for a given variable [p (C)] to be considered
as a mediator between an independent variable (expectations)
and a dependent variable (judgments), three criteria must be
present (see, e.g., Baron and Kenny, 1986): (a) the independent
variable must significantly predict the dependent variable (path
c in Figure 3A); (b) the independent variable must significantly
predict the mediator variable (path a in Figure 3B); and (c) the
mediator variable must significantly predict the dependent vari-
able, once controlled for the effect of the independent variable
2Participants with extreme response rates, those who responded in every trial or in
none of them, lacked one of the two conditional probabilities needed to compute
the experienced contingency (see Introduction), because they were not exposed
to trials of one of the potential cause conditions (i.e., presence or absence of the
medicine). Data from these participants could have been discarded as missing data.
However, we decided to consider the conditional probability as zero in these cases,
and compute the experienced contingency in that way, because those participants
were highly representative of the response bias we were studying. Nevertheless, we
also conducted an alternative analysis discarding the data of those participants. The
results of this alternative analysis do not differ from the analysis presented here.
TABLE 3 | Results of the mediational analysis of Experiment 1.
Predictors B ETB β t Targets
Step 1: expectations −19.994 8.198 −0.329 −2.439* Judgment
Step 2: expectations −0.2897 0.0757 −0.480 −3.827** p
(
C
)
Step 3: expectations −0.470 7.390 −0.008 −0.064 Judgment
p
(
C
)
67.395 12.238 0.670 5.507** Judgment
B, non-standardized coefficient; ETB, standard error of B; p
(
C
)
, potential cause
probability.
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.001.
(path b in Figure 3B). In addition, if the effect of the indepen-
dent variable over the dependent variable decreases to zero after
the inclusion of the mediator variable in the model (i.e., absence
of significance of path c in Figure 3B), it is said that there is a
perfect mediation. Table 3 shows the results of the mediational
analysis conducted using the PROCESS procedure developed by
Hayes (2013) which implements bootstrap confidence intervals
for inference about indirect effects. As shown in the table, all three
criteria necessary to be considered a mediational variable were
met. In addition, Table 3 shows that the influence of expecta-
tions on judgments vanished as p (C) was included in the model.
This means that this variable is acting as a mediator between
the expectations and the judgments, and that this is a perfect
mediation. A Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) conducted over this model
showed that the mediation effect was significant (z = −3.14,
p < 0.001). The effect size of the mediation effect (as computed
by the product of the effect sizes of the paths a and b) was large
(dr = 0.67).
These results support the mediational hypothesis that previ-
ous expectations about a relationship between a potential cause
and an outcome affect the assessment of causality between them
by modifying the behavior of participants, which ultimately
determines the probability with which the cause occurs in a free
response task. However, given these data, it remains possible
that the previous expectations affected both the judgments of
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the participants and the probability with which they decided to
administer the medicine during the training trials. The design
of Experiment 1 is not able to discard this hypothesis given
that the two potential factors, expectations and p (C), were not
controlled independently. In addition, given that p (C) was not
manipulated, the causal role of this factor over the differences
in judgments cannot be assumed. An experimental design that
intervenes orthogonally over p (C) in addition to over the expec-
tations is necessary to elucidate the real effect of each of these two
factors over the judgments of participants.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to address the potential limitations
of Experiment 1. Keeping in mind this objective, we now manip-
ulated orthogonally the two factors involved in the mediational
model proposed in Experiment 1, the previous expectations and
the p (C). The learning task used in this second experiment was
the same as the one used in Experiment 1. However, the new task
demands a passive role of participants, instead of an active role. A
passive learning task was used to allow for the experimental con-
trol of the instances in the contingency cell that the participants
would receive in each trial, or in other words, in order to manip-
ulate p (C). In order for Experiment 2 to resemble Experiment 1
as closely as possible the two levels of p (C) were programmed to
be high (0.8) and medium (0.5), as these two values were similar
to the mean probabilities displayed by the two groups in Experi-
ment 1 (see Table 2). In line with the mediational hypothesis, we
expected that once we controlled p (C) by depriving participants
of the ability to respond freely, the effect of the previous expec-
tations would disappear, showing uniquely the main effect of the
probability of the potential cause.
Method
Participants and Apparatus
The participants were 114 anonymous Internet users who vis-
ited our virtual laboratory (http://www.labpsico.deusto.es). Data
was treated in the same manner as in the previous experiment in
respect to privacy and anonymity of participants. The experimen-
tal task was a version of the one previously used in Experiment 1,
and it used the same technology. The software randomly assigned
each participant to one of four experimental groups. This pro-
cedure resulted in 55 participants who were placed in Group
ExC-O, 29 of whom were in the high p (C) condition and 26 of
whom were in the medium p (C) condition. The other 59 partic-
ipants were placed in Group ExNoC-O, 32 of whom were in the
high p (C) condition and 27 of whom were in the medium p (C)
condition.
Procedure and Design
The computer program used for Experiment 2 was a version of
that used in Experiment 1. As in the previous experiment, the
manipulation of the expectations was conducted through instruc-
tions. Half of the participants were induced to expect that the
medicine produced the improvement of the patients, whereas
the other half was induced to expect that the medicine was not
necessary to produce such improvement. Differently from the
previous experiment, the task used in Experiment 2 did not
allow participants to decide whether or not to administer the
medicine. In each trial they could see whether the patient had
taken Batatrim or not. At this point, they were requested to
respond to a Yes/No predictive question (Do you think the patient
will recover from the crisis?) The predictive question was intro-
duced in order to maintain the participants’ attention and to
make sure they were reading the screen. Once the response was
given, the participants could see whether the patient had recov-
ered from the crisis. The training phase contained 100 trials.
The sequence of potential cause (medicine intake) and outcome
(recovery from crisis) pairings was pre-established in a manner
that resembled the co-occurrence information received by the
two groups in Experiment 1. Half of the participants were pre-
sented with a sequence of trials in which p (C) was of 0.8, which
resembles the mean p (C) of Group ExC-O in Experiment 1. The
other half was presented with a sequence of trials in which this
probability was 0.5, which resembled the mean p (C) of Group
ExNoC-O in Experiment 1. The probability of the outcome was
high (0.8) in all cases. Likewise, the contingency was set to zero
for all participants and we looked for differences in their illusion
(overestimation) of causality. Therefore, Experiment 2 resulted in
a between-subjects 2 × 2 design in which both expectations and
p (C) were manipulated orthogonally. At the end of the training
phase, the test phase presented participants with the same judg-
mental question as in Experiment 1, which was answered in an
identical way.
Results and Discussion
Figure 4 shows the mean judgments in Experiment 2. As
expected, the judgments of participants who were exposed to a
high p (C) were higher that the judgments of participants who
were exposed to a medium p (C). Moreover, mean judgments did
not differ as a function of the expectations. A 2 × 2 ANOVA
on participants’ judgments as dependent variable showed a main
effect of the probability of the potential cause, p (C), F(1, 110) =
5.25, p = 0.024, η2p = 0.05. Neither the main effect of
FIGURE 4 | Mean judgments in Experiment 2 for each condition of
expectations and for each condition of p
(
C
)
. The error bars represent the
standard error of the mean.
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the expectations nor the interaction were significant [largest
F(1, 110) = 0.83].
These results provide evidence that supports the mediational
hypothesis, as they suggest that when the effect of the pre-
vious expectations over participants’ behavior [p (C)] is con-
trolled, their effect on the participants’ judgments disappears.
Only the effect of p (C)] remained significant. The results of this
second experiment suggest that previous expectations do not
affect the judgments. By contrast, only the information to which
participants were exposed was actually affecting their judgments.
General Discussion
The results support the hypothesis that people’s previous expec-
tations about the causal relationship between two events affect
their assessment of that relationship by modulating their behav-
ioral patterns when they have the opportunity to decide about
the presence, or absence, of the potential cause (Experiment 1).
On the contrary, when the presence of the potential cause is not
under the participants’ control (Experiment 2), the influence of
their previous expectations becomes overshadowed by that of the
evidence to which they are exposed. This leaves causal judgments
determined only by this last source of information, and therefore
affected by well-known biases in contingency learning, such as
the cause-density bias.
The results of the mediational analysis conducted in Experi-
ment 1 suggest that the probability with which the cause occurred
[i.e., p (C)]; in this case, the probability with which the partici-
pant acted] was affected by ourmanipulation of expectancies, and
this behavior was able to explain the causal judgments emitted at
the end of training. Moreover, the analysis showed that when the
p (C) was controlled, the effect of the expectations over the judg-
ments disappeared. The results of Experiment 2 strengthen the
mediational hypothesis. They show that when the experimental
setting does not allow participants to decide whether or not the
potential cause is present, the effect of previous expectations over
causal judgments (as well as the interaction), become not sig-
nificant. As could be expected, however, the effect of the p (C)
manipulation was significant. This means that when previous
expectations could not influence the behavior of the participants,
their effect on judgments became insignificant. Only through the
mediation of behavior did previous expectations influence the
development of the illusion of causality.
In Experiment 1, we anticipated that because participants in
Group ExC-O believed that the medicine produced recovery,
they would respond with higher probability than participants in
Group ExNoC-O. The results confirmed this prediction. Interest-
ingly, this could occur through at least two different motivations.
On the one hand the participants might be motivated to obtain
the outcome (patients’ recovery); on the other one, they might
be using a positive test strategy to confirm their hypothesis. In
any case, this aspect was identical for both groups and therefore
it cannot explain the differences observed in their behavior and
judgments. The critical aspect of the present results is that they
show that expectations affect the participants’ response rates [i.e.,
p (C)], which may lead to exposure to biased information, and
that this in turn will lead to misperceive the causal relationship.
Experiment 2 provided further support for this idea. By providing
a situation in which p (C) was preprogramed by the researchers,
expectations could no longer influence judgments by producing
changes in p (C) In this case, the potential influence of expec-
tations on judgments was overshadowed by p (C), which now
affected judgments directly.
The results of these experiments are, in part, congruent with
the idea that people’s previous knowledge and expectations can
determine the treatment that they give to available evidence in
the assessment of causal relationship (Crocker and Taylor, 1978;
Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Metalsky and Abramson, 1981; Alloy and
Tabachnik, 1984; Waldmann and Martignon, 1998; Griffiths and
Tenenbaum, 2005, 2009). Along this line, some authors have sug-
gested that previous knowledge may define how people interpret
the available evidence, for example, by influencing the confidence
given to each type of evidence (Crocker and Taylor, 1978) or by
affecting the perception of the frequency of each of them (Alloy
and Tabachnik, 1984). Our study suggests that the influence of
previous expectations takes place before the evidence is inter-
preted, in a stage in which the evidence is not yet available. In
a sense, expectations determine which information will be avail-
able. This seems congruent with the idea of prior probability
distributions as they intervene in causal inferences before the pre-
sentation of new evidence (e.g., Waldmann andMartignon, 1998;
Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2005). Moreover, some researchers
have suggested that these prior probability distributions, based
on previous knowledge can also determine people’s interventions
on new evidence (e.g., Steyvers et al., 2003; Schulz et al., 2007).
Consistent with this idea, in our experimental setting previous
knowledge influenced the participants’ behavior.
On the other hand, the approach claiming that previous
knowledge is more decisive than available evidence in the estab-
lishment of causal estimations (e.g., Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Met-
alsky and Abramson, 1981; Alloy and Tabachnik, 1984; White,
1989; Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2005; Lagnado et al., 2007) is
not supported by the results of the present research. Follow-
ing this approach, some authors suggested that evidence on the
co-occurrence of two events is not taken into account when
previous knowledge points toward the inexistence of a rela-
tionship between them (e.g., White, 1989; Griffiths and Tenen-
baum, 2005). Similarly, Fugelsang and Thompson (2000) found
an interaction between the effect of previous expectations and
the available evidence. They suggested that the effect of this last
factor was smaller when previous knowledge signaled that the
causal relationship was unbelievable than when it was believable.
Our results do not show an interaction between previous expecta-
tions and available evidence. Furthermore, there was not a main
effect of previous expectations in our research when the avail-
able evidence about co-occurrence between the two events was
controlled for.
The difference between our results and those of Fugelsang and
Thompson (2000) may reside in the manner in which the two
studies manipulate previous expectations. In our experiments the
cover story was the same for all participants and recreated a plau-
sible situation in which a potential relationship existed between
a cause and an outcome (a medicine that cured the crises of a
certain disease). In this situation we manipulated only the partial
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(and veridical) information that the participants received about
the relationship before they started the experiment. To do aim,
we changed just one sentence in the instructions of each group.
One group was informed about the actual probability of the out-
come in the presence of the cue, the other one was informed
about the actual probability of the outcome in the absence of
the cue. The Fugelsang and Thompson’s study, however, manip-
ulated the cover story so that some stories were about commonly
believable relationships and others about unbelievable relation-
ships. The fact that a relationship was seen as totally unbeliev-
able could have led participants of Fugelsong and Thompson’s
study to leave the available evidence unattended. Our expecta-
tions manipulation, by contrast, was intentionally subtle, as we
were aiming to test how minor differences in the way in which
contingency information is presented might produce different
expectations thatmight promote different judgments of causality.
Interestingly, this manipulation of expectancies was able to affect
the participants’ judgments through behavioral changes, but not
directly. The effect of expectancies on contingency learning was
overshadowed by the available evidence when behavioral changes
where neutralized.
The results of the present study are congruent with the
approach which claims that the assessment of causality is mainly
based on how people interpret the perceived evidence derived
from the co-occurrence of cause and outcome events (e.g.,
Crocker, 1982; Wasserman et al., 1990; Kao and Wasserman,
1993; Anderson and Sheu, 1995; Perales and Shanks, 2007;White,
2009; Matute et al., 2011; Yarritu et al., 2014). According to this
perspective, people assess each instance in the contingency cell
in a different manner, being the instances in which the poten-
tial cause and the outcome coincide (i.e., cells a) the ones which
typically most influence the estimation of causality (e.g., Kao and
Wasserman, 1993). It follows from this assumption that any cir-
cumstance that contributes to a larger number of a instances,
with respect to the other ones, will promote an overestimation
of causality, which can lead to an illusion of causality in the
conditions in which the potential cause and the outcome are
actually unrelated (Yarritu et al., 2014). One of these circum-
stances is related to the probability with which the potential cause
occurs. As mentioned in the Introduction, it has been shown
that when the p (C) is high, causal judgments tend to be higher
than when this probability is low (e.g., Perales and Shanks, 2007;
Hannah and Beneteau, 2009; Matute et al., 2011; Blanco et al.,
2013). The results of Experiment 2 show that, minor differ-
ences in this probability can determine the degree of illusion of
causality.
In sum, this study shows how previous knowledge and
expectancies can contribute to the development of causal illu-
sions. Previous knowledge, or previously received information
that was accepted as valid, biases behavior by increasing the prob-
ability of the potential cause (in this case, the participants’ behav-
ior). This biased behavior produces a cause-density bias, which is
known to have an important role in the development of such as
illusions.
One important implication from this research is that our
results could explain, for example, how people who hold a
favorable view about a pseudoscientific and ineffective medical
treatment could bias themselves by taking the innocuous drug
frequently and ignoring what might happen had not them taken
it. This behavior could lead them to erroneously confirm their
previous false belief. Importantly, however, our research also sug-
gests that this bias could be attenuated by a simple advertising
campaign informing people about what happens when the poten-
tial cause is not present. Our research shows that this informa-
tion results in these people changing their behavior and therefore
reducing their illusion as well.
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